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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SCM LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, , 
vs. ] 
WATKINS & FABER, and ] 
WALTER P. FABER, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19172 
PREFATORY STATEMENT 
SCMfs statement that the "Facts have been mis-
characterized" by Appellant is simply untrue. The facts 
cited in Appellant's brief are accurate and uncontested and 
conclusively establish the basis for the two crucial questions 
in this case — (1) Was Fischer's 1979 promise to Watkins & 
Faber for adjacent office space consideration for the signing 
of the written 19 79 lease?, and, if so, (2) Does Watkins & 
Faber have any remedy for SCM's refusal to keep the promise? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT PREVENT 
RESCISSION FOR REFUSAL OF THE PROMISE. 
SCM's brief emphasizes the Statute of Frauds and 
argues that there was not an enforceable oral contract for 
the adjacent space, and therefore, Watkins & Faber has no 
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remedy whatever. Even assuming for purposes of argument 
that the oral promise for the adjacent space could not 
be specifically enforced because it was not in writing, 
there is no doubt that the promise was made and that it was 
specifically made to induce Watkins & Faber to sign the 
written lease of July 9, 1979. If, as SCM argues, Fischer's 
promise was meaningless, then in fairness the 1979 lease 
which would not have existed but for the promise should also 
be just as meaningless. Contrary to SCMfs position that the 
promise had no value, it is undisputed that it had sufficient 
value to cause the 1979 lease to be signed. 
Because the promise induced Watkins & Faber to 
sign the 1979 lease, it should not be isolated as an independent < 
transaction which might be unenforceable under the Statute 
of Frauds. Where valuable consideration was specifically 
given to obtain the promise, that consideration should be i 
returned or cancelled if the promise is deemed not enforce-
able because of the Statute of Frauds. If SCM cannot be 
forced to enter into a lease agreement for the adjacent space, 
then Watkins & Faber should not be forced to continue per-
formance under the 1979 renewal lease. The Restatement of 
Contracts, Second, endorses legal principles applicable to 
this case. Section 141 states as follows: 
§141. Action for Value of Performance Under 
Unenforceable Contract. 
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(1) In an action for the value of 
performance under a contract, except as stated 
in Subsection (2), the Statute of Frauds does 
not invalidate any defense which would be avail-
able if the contract were enforceable against 
both parties, 
(2) Where a party to a contract which is 
unenforceable against him refuses either to 
perform the contract or to sign a sufficient 
memorandum, the other party is justified in sus-
pending any performance for which he has not 
already received the agreed return, and such a 
suspension is not a defense in an action for 
the value of performance rendered before the 
suspension• [Emphasis added.] 
The Statute of Frauds does not invalidate the 
defense of failure of consideration. Because SCM failed 
to provide the promised adjacent office space, Watkins & 
Faber was justified in suspending any further performance 
under the lease. 
Another provision of the Restatement of Contracts, 
Second, Section 139, directs itself to specific enforcement 
of oral promises. Even though Watkins & Faber is not seeking 
specific performance, the section emphasizes the principle 
that the Statute of Frauds will not be applied where injustice 
will occur. Section 139 states as follows: 
§139. Enforcement by Virtue of Action in 
Reliance. 
(1) A promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance 
on the part of the promisee or a third person and 
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which does induce the action or forbearance is 
enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds 
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of 
the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to 
be limited as justice requires. 
(2) In determining whether injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise, the 
following circumstances are significant: 
(a) the availability and adequacy of 
other remedies, particularly cancellation 
and restitution; 
(b) the definite and substantial char-
acter of the action or forbearance in relation 
to the remedy sought; 
(c) the extent to which the action or 
forbearance corroborates evidence of the 
making and terms of the promise, or the making 
and terms are otherwise established by clear 
and convincing evidence; 
(d) the reasonableness of the action or 
forbearance; 
(e) the extent to which the action or 
forbearance was foreseeable by the promisor. 
One factor in determining whether injustice can b 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise is the avail-
ability or adequacy of other remedies, particularly can-
cellation. 
In this situation, the promise for additional 
adjacent space was the only reason Watkins & Faber renewed 
their lease in 1979. Watkins & Faber honored the lease and 
paid rent until SCM refused to honor the promise. Watkins 
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Faber moved from the building because the failure of the 
promise justified suspension of performance under the 
lease and cancellation of said lease* It would be unjust 
to hold Watkins & Faber to a lease which would never have 
been signed but for the promise which SCM refused to honor. 
POINT II. SCM IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELY ON 
THE RECORDING ACT. 
SCM argued to the lower court that it was a bona 
fide purchaser under the recording act and has advanced 
that argument in its brief. The lower court ruled that 
the recording act was not applicable because Watkins & Faber 
was not attempting to enforce the oral promise for adjacent 
space. Even assuming for purposes of argument that the 
recording act applies to the oral promise given as consid-
eration for signing the 1979 renewal lease, in truth SCM 
was not a bona fide purchaser because it knowingly assumed 
the risk of claims and liabilities arising as a result of 
SCMrs later actions which conflicted with prior unwritten 
tenant obligations. SCM's own purchase documents with 
Fischer show that SCM considered the possibility of un-
written obligations to tenants. For the purpose of showing 
that SCM considered the risk and knowingly incurred some 
liability to tenants under the purchase agreement with Fischer, 
-5-
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Appellant moved to introduce the Exchange Agreement between 
SCM and Fischer. (R-197). The lower court refused to admit 
the Exchange Agreement, Exhibit 4D, paragraph 6 of which 
states as follows: 
Indemnification. Company hereby agrees to 
indemnify and hold Fischer harmless from and 
against all claims and liabilities arising out 
of the ownership, operation and management of the 
Fischer Property from and after the Fischer 
Property Transfer Date. 
On the other side, the lower court admitted the Assignment 
of the Tenant Leases, Exhibit IP, paragraph 2 of which 
states as follows: 
. ... It is expressly agreed that Assignee 
shall have no authority or duty to negotiate, 
compromise or settle any unwritten obligations of 
Assignor. { 
By the above wording, SCM acknowledged the possibility of 
unwritten obligations to tenants. The lower court erred 
by not admitting the Exchange Agreement because after SCM 
purchased the building, SCM entered into a long-term lease 
with IML thereby preventing fulfillment of the 1979 promise 
of adjacent space, an unwritten obligation to Appellant. 
The Assignment of Tenant Leases provides that SCM had no 
authority or duty to negotiate, compromise or settle the 
lessor's unwritten obligations, but it clearly does not 
relieve SCM from liability for SCM!s own actions thereafter 
which interferred with one such unwritten tenant obligation. 
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By virtue of the Exchange Agreement, SCM specifically 
assumed all liability for SCM's actions which might have 
compromised unwritten obligations whose performance had not 
taken place. It is obvious from the wording of the two 
documents that SCM considered that its actjsjion} could 
conflict with unwritten obligations Fischer owed to Newhouse 
tenants. Nevertheless, SCM consciously chose not to 
inquire of the Newhouse tenants, including Appellant, before 
it purchased the Newhouse Building and gave IML a long-term 
lease on the sixth floor.. 
SCM's long-term lease of the sixth floor to IML 
conflicted with the unwritten promise of additional space 
to Appellant. Since SCM expressly assumed responsibility 
for its actions and was not a bona fide purchaser, it 
should not be allowed to deny the promise and prevent 
termination of the 19 79 lease. 
CONCLUSION 
The Statute of Frauds does not invalidate 
Appellant's defense of failure of consideration. 
Even if the recording act were applicable to this 
situation, SCM is not a bona fide purchaser. The promise of 
adjacent office space was consideration for signing the 1979 
renewal lease. It would be unjust to hold Watkins & Faber 
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to a lease which would never have been signed but for the 
promise of adjacent space and deny any relief whatever for 
failure of the promise. 
1983. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of October, 
WATKINS & FABER 
By ^i^UiL^ «<J ^u£Z&~^~^ 
Brian W. Burnett 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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